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THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS SHAREHOLDER: AN 
APPLICATION, AN EXTENSION, AND A CHALLENGE 
KENT GREENFIELD 
One of the enduring debates in corporate governance scholarship and doctrine 
is, to borrow a phrase, for whom are corporate managers trustees.1 Should 
 
 Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. 
1 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1160-63 (1932) (examining tension between corporate managers’ responsibilities to 
shareholders and their responsibilities to society). This debate remains a lively—and 
voluminous—one. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 125-52 (2006) (advocating principles of corporate 
governance based on broader responsibilties to stakehholders); LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 9-11 (2012) (criticizing “shareholder value thinking” as 
myopic view of corporate managers’ responsibilities); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550-52 
(2003) (advocating for director primacy approach to analysis of corporate governance); 
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
850-75 (2005) (arguing for shareholders’ power to make “rules-of-the-game” decisions); Kent 
Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1055-59 
(2008) (juxtaposing shareholder primacy model of corporate governance with stakeholder 
model); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2000) (asserting that consensus has formed around “view that corporate 
law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value”); Michelle M. Harner, 
Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 
544 (2010) (analyzing “similarities between controlling shareholders and controlling 
creditors” and policies to govern controlling stakeholder actions); Grant Hayden & Matthew 
T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2071, 2095-120 (2010) (arguing nonshareholder constituents should be treated 
like shareholders); Katherine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of 
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 312 (2011) 
(advocating policies that empower stakeholder investors); Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory 
in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 264-98 
(2010) (examining debate between stakeholder theory and shareholder primacy); Ian B. Lee, 
Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 
537-70 (2006) (analyzing criticism of shareholder primacy based on efficiency concerns); 
David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the 
Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1993) (detailing how clash 
between pro-shareholder and nonshareholder viewpoints animates crisis in corporate law’s 
normative foundations); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
1013, 1018-21 (2013) (detailing emergence of radical shareholder primacy as approach to 
corporate governance focused on short-time horizons); Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of 
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corporations be managed primarily to serve shareholder interests or to serve a 
more robust set of stakeholder interests? That debate has ebbed and flowed over 
the last century, with some commentators arguing that we are in a historical 
moment when it is again salient.2 One piece of supporting evidence is Senator 
Elizabeth Warren’s recent introduction of the Accountable Capitalism Act,3 
which requires large corporations to be chartered at the national level and 
mandates that forty percent of their directors be elected by employees.4 The bill 
has no chance of success in the current political climate, but the fact that a 
prominent politician and potential presidential candidate believes that 
progressive corporate governance reform is something that can rally voters 
speaks volumes about the contemporary importance of the shareholder primacy 
debate. 
For corporate governance scholars, this debate is the intellectual equivalent 
of the divide between the Red Sox and the Yankees. You find your tribe early in 
your sentient life, and no amount of persuasion, argument, or data will move 
you. The battle lines are intransigent. 
Professor David Webber’s new book, The Rise of the Working-Class 
Shareholder, is especially valuable given this intransigence.5 Webber turns our 
attention to the vast, largely untapped power of the trillions of dollars parked in 
 
Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 1954 (May 2018) (providing “empirical 
review of judicial discussion of shareholder profit maximization in the era of the modern 
corporation, 1900 to 2016”); Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder: 
Theoretical Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193, 
238-40 (2005) (arguing corporations have never been solely shareholder focused). 
2 See Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July-
Aug. 2012, at 48, 57 (advocating prioritization of long-term shareholders and more productive 
interactions between shareholders, managers, and boards over big reforms); Joe Nocera, 
Down With Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010, at A19 (describing new 
movement “aimed at overturning the hegemony of shareholder value”); Steven Denning, The 
Dumbest Idea in the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011, 1:19 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/28/maximizing-shareholder-value-
the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/GG5F-WH97] (admonishing executives to 
focus on customers rather than shareholders); Steven Pearlstein, How the Cult of Shareholder 
Value Wrecked American Business, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/09/how-the-cult-of-
shareholder-value-wrecked-american-business/ (cataloguing economic deletarious effects of 
maximizing shareholder value); Stefan Stern, Transcend “Shareholder Value” for All Our 
Sakes, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a288288-583e-11e4-
a31b-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3Is1UZ900 (arguing focus on maximizing 
shareholder value creates unsustainable externalities). 
3 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
4 See id. §§ 4, 6 (seeking to rebalance shareholder and stakeholder interests through federal 
corporate law). 
5 DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST 
WEAPON, at xii (2018) (claiming pension funds are “tremendous source of power for labor”). 
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employee pension funds.6 Because of these assets, labor can press their interests 
vis-à-vis corporate governance within a shareholder primacy framework.7 The 
intransigence is immaterial. One does not have to convince policy makers to 
expand the board or to broaden the notion of fiduciary duty to include a 
consideration of employee interests.8 All that is required is for labor to assert its 
collective power as owner of capital. As Webber explains, the power of labor as 
owner of capital can operate in two ways, which might be called labor-as-
shareholder and shareholder-as-labor.9  
When labor acts as active shareholders, they push companies in various ways, 
most prominently with regard to time horizon. That “short-termism” is a 
problem, and that it is prevalent, is an area of broad agreement.10 The turnover 
rate for shares of most companies in the United States is over one hundred and 
fifty percent per year,11 and the daily volume in the United States of high-
frequency trading, in which investors hold stocks for seconds or less, is as much 
as seventy percent.12 
 
6 See id. (noting value of pension funds “amount to somewhere between $3 and $6 
trillion”). 
7 Id. at 17-18 (outlining potential power of shareholder framework). 
8 See id. at 181-211 (exploring relation of fiduciary duty conceptions to issue of capture). 
9 Id. at xii (claiming “power of labor’s capital operates along two dimensions: advancing 
workers’ interests as workers, and advancing workers’ interest as long-term shareholders 
saving for retirement”).  
10 See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 
37 IOWA J. CORP. L. 265, 293-323 (2012) (detailing effects of investment practices, 
management techniques, and firm cultures on short-termism); Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of 
Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 628 (2011) (exploring externality of “future 
costs to shareholders”); Rachelle C. Sampson & Yuan Shi, Are US Firms and Markets 
Becoming More Short-Term Oriented? Evidence of Shifting Firm and Investor Time 
Horizons, 1980-2013, at 9-19 (Oct. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2837524 [https://perma.cc/J9UK-853M] (providing evidence 
of increasing short-termism in U.S. equity capital markets).  
11 See Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%) of United States, WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR?end=2016&locations=US&star 
t=2000 [https://perma.cc/Y63Z-AU7P] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018) (tracing stocks traded 
since 2000).  
12 See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED 
OVER INDUSTRY 277-78 (2007) (examing incentives for short-term stockholding); Matthew 
O’Brien, Everything You Need to Know About High-Frequency Trading, ATLANTIC (Apr. 11, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/04/everything-you-need-to-know 
-about-high-frequency-trading/360411/ [https://perma.cc/JL7D-Z7GM] (detailing how half 
of stock trades are high frequency); Shobhit Seth, The World Of High Frequency Algorithmic 
Trading, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/ 
091615/world-high-frequency-algorithmic-trading.asp [https://perma.cc/A3MY-3D68] 
(showing sixty to seventy percent of trades in United States attributable to high frequency 
trading during 2009-2010, though it has since decreased).  
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This pattern of short-term holding means that most shareholders will tend to 
ignore or disregard any change in the value of their stock occurring at a later 
time. They will prioritize the short term in their choice of shares to hold and in 
their influence on management in companies whose shares they hold.13 
Management adhering to the interests of those shareholders will prioritize short-
term gains even if the result is long-term difficulties.14 
Labor-as-shareholder helps retard that trend. Because employees invest for 
retirement, pension funds are the prototypical long-term investor, desiring the 
appreciation of their portfolio over time. Any effort by companies to prioritize 
short-term returns at the expense of the long-term health of the company will be 
opposed by employee investors. This means that active pension funds can 
provide a necessary corrective to the pressures from other holders of capital, 
which frequently pressure management to prioritize the short term.15 
As Webber discusses, pension funds can also provide meaningful benefits 
when acting as shareholder-as-labor. Webber convincingly argues that the 
investment and voting decisions of pension fund trustees may take into account 
not only the impact of those decisions on the corpus of the fund but also on the 
lives of the workers who contribute to it.16 Webber concedes that it is a “widely 
shared view” that the trustees of a fund have a duty of loyalty that runs only to 
the fund itself rather than the employee beneficiaries of it.17 But he argues that 
such a view is “errant”18 and that the investment power of funds can be used to 
preserve jobs (by opposing privatization, for example) or to create jobs (by 
 
13 See Jillian A. Popadak, A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder 
Governance Reduces Firm Value 26-37 (Oct. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2345384 [https://perma.cc/9YXX-VSKA] (correlating increased 
shareholder voice in governance with greater attention to short-term tangible results and 
decreases in attention to intangible sources of long-term value). 
14 See MITCHELL, supra note 12, at 1 (“A recent survey of more than four hundred chief 
financial officers of major American corporations revealed that almost 80 percent of them 
would have at least moderately mutilated their businesses in order to meet analysts’ quarterly 
profit estimates.”); Lee Drutman, The Long Term Value Moment, AM. PROSPECT (July 6, 
2007), http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_longterm_value_moment [https://perma.cc/ 
P4YP-88SJ] (cataloging various studies pointing out pathologies of short-termism as business 
strategy). There are complexities to this description of the problem of short-termism that I 
address elsewhere but do not address here. See Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630-34 (2011) (identifying short-termism strategies). 
15 See Popadak, supra note 13, at 10 (detailing pressures felt by executives to deliver short-
term gains to shareholders); Sampson & Shi, supra note 10, at 8 (“External pressures may 
also lead firms to shorten their investment horizons . . . .”). For a longer explanation of the 
importance of stakeholder governance in reducing short-termism, see KENT GREENFIELD, 
CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO: (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 218-22 (2018). 
16 WEBBER, supra note 5, at 182-83 (2018) (analyzing law of fiduciary duty’s ability to 
further labor’s interests). 
17 Id. at 183 (outlining narrow view of fiduciary duty). 
18 Id. 
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investing in companies that offer well-paying jobs, for example).19 As Webber 
argues, “a broader view of fiduciary duty empowers pension fund trustees to 
consider how these investments actually impact their work-contributors . . . .”20 
In Webber’s view, pension funds can and should use their financial power both 
as investors and as activist shareholders to protect and advance the interests of 
workers. 
Both of these strategies—labor-as-shareholder and shareholder-as-labor—
offer the potential for change within corporations and corporate governance 
without deciding or waiting for a shift in the larger shareholder vs. stakeholder 
debate.21 For those of us reaching for those more fundamental changes, Webber 
shows that there are lower hanging fruits available for plucking. This book is 
now the definitive treatment of a little-understood area of the investment world, 
and it makes a spirited case for the promise of using labor assets to leverage real 
change in the way companies are run. To use a Webber quote from a different 
context, “It [is] hardly the French Revolution, but it [is] a start.”22 
Two aspects of the book deserve special mention. First, Webber includes a 
number of vignettes focusing on specific individuals who have played important 
roles in various battles on behalf of labor. Heather Slavkin Corzo, an AFL-CIO 
official (and Boston University School of Law alumna) pushed the SEC to adopt 
a disclosure rule on CEO-to-worker pay ratios.23 Erik Lie, a scholar at the 
University of Iowa, first exposed the ubiquitous problem of backdating options 
to benefit corporate executives.24 Barry McAnarney, the Executive Director of 
the Massachusetts Laborers’ Pension Fund, pressured the real estate company 
that owned Zucotti Park near Wall Street to allow the Occupy protesters to stay 
put for a few weeks.25 Professor Jack Beermann courageously expressed 
contrary viewpoints at a conference at George Mason sponsored by the Koch 
brothers.26 These stories not only make the text more accessible, they provide a 
valuable service by shining a light on these individuals and their work. A pat on 
the back can go a long way. 
Second, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder also serves an important 
pedagogical purpose. Many law students have internalized the lessons law 
schools have been implicitly teaching for decades: those who want to pursue 
 
19 Id. at 197 (claiming where difference between worker-centric approach and maximize-
returns approach “really matters is in managing the threat of privatization or making 
investments that create worker jobs”).  
20 Id. at 198. 
21 Id. at xiv (arguing markets “must be transformed from within”). 
22 Id. at 53. 
23 Id. at 145-51 (narrating how Corzo was able to force SEC to adopt disclosure rule).  
24 Id. at 164-67 (detailing Lee’s findings). 
25 Id. at 97 (describing how McAnarney leveraged “power as an investor in a real-estate 
corporation” to buy time for Occupy Wall Street). 
26 Id. at 233-34 (outlining Beermann’s views on public pension reform). 
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careers in the law to achieve social progress should practice in areas like civil 
rights, human rights, constitutional law, and environmental justice. Business and 
corporate practice can be left to those who have a different set of priorities and 
may be on a different part of the political and ideological spectrum. But this 
book makes clear that a deep knowledge of how markets work can be immensely 
helpful when married to a commitment to using that knowledge to help real 
people. Webber’s book is a wonderful example to students of what someone 
with his commitments can achieve even if they are—to quote him—“a midlevel, 
bag-carrying, law firm associate.”27 
Finally, three points regarding the ideas presented in The Rise of the Working-
Class Shareholder are worth exploring. The first is an application of Webber’s 
ideas. The second is an extension of his ideas. The third is a challenge to one of 
his ideas. 
As for application, consider the public debate about guns. Hardly a month 
goes by without another grisly reminder of the prevalence of guns and the 
violence they engender. But guns are not only dangerous—they are lucrative. 
The gun industry produced over fifty billion dollars of economic impact 
nationwide in 2017,28 and the industry annually produces over nine million 
firearms.29 And the business is growing: In 2017, the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives reported an estimated forty-three percent 
increase in firearms manufacturing in the United States within the last five 
years.30 The wealth created flows into the coffers of not only the manufacturers, 
but also retailers such as Walmart and Dick’s Sporting Goods. Moreover, up 
until the Parkland shooting on February 14, 2018, those who love guns were 
considered an attractive market demographic, with some companies actively 
seeking to take advantage of their fandom. Examples included Amazon’s video 
service streaming the NRA channel, airlines offering discounts to NRA 
members, and credit card companies offering gun-branded cards.31 
As Webber points out, most pension funds invest in companies that benefit 
one way or the other from the gun trade.32 Most ironically perhaps, teachers’ 
 
27 Id. at 173. 
28 Andrew Lisa, Gun Industry Contributes $51.3B to US Economy, Research Shows, MSN 
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/gun-industry-contributes-dollar513 
b-to-us-economy-research-shows/ar-AAvuCzz (ranking states according to level of economic 
activity linked to gun industry).  
29 Press Release, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Releases 
2017 Report on Firearms Commerce in the U.S. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/ 
atf-releases-2017-report-firearms-commerce-us [https://perma.cc/3LLU-3YX7] (ranking 
states according to number of registered weapons). 
30 Id. (cataloguing specific weapons for which sales increased). 
31 See Julie Creswell & Tiffany Hsu, Connection to N.R.A. Can Be Bad for Business, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2018, at A12 (detailing controversy surrounding companies’ links to gun 
industry). 
32 WEBBER, supra note 5, at 35-36 (observing how largest pension funds invested in gun 
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pensions (like most public employees’ pensions) are invested in guns to the tune 
of billions if not trillions of dollars.33 It is profoundly and horribly ironic that 
teachers at Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, were murdered 
by a man wielding an AR-15, which is produced by Outdoor Brands Corp.—a 
company in which the Florida teachers’ pension fund invests.34 
Webber discusses how the California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
(“CalSTRS”) divested from gun companies after the murders in an elementary 
school in Newtown, Connecticut in 2012.35 Recognizing Webber’s arguments 
that pension funds can use the power of shareholder-as-labor, this practice of 
divestment needs to be expanded to other teachers’ funds around the country. 
Teachers, unfortunately, have become first responders. Imagine the potential of 
using public pension funds—and especially teachers’ pension funds—to fight 
against guns by divesting from gun manufacturers, gun retailers, and others who 
benefit from the gun industry. Fund managers will have to make strategic 
choices based on their answers to age-old questions, which Webber flags, of 
whether divestment is done to exert leverage for change or for moral and 
political purity, and whether divestment is strategically more powerful than 
remaining an investor and exerting influence from within.36 But I cannot imagine 
a better group than teachers to stand up to the gun industry, especially since so 
many of the powerful teachers’ funds are in blue states.37 
As an extension of Webber’s book, one idea not mentioned but that fits nicely 
in this field is the use of the ultra vires doctrine.38 That doctrine constrains 
 
companies). 
33 Id. (noting how largest pension funds connected to gun companies managed by teacher 
unions). 
34 Neil Weinberg & Polly Mosendz, Teacher Retirement Funds in 12 States Hold Gun 
Company Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-02-22/teacher-retirement-funds-in-12-states-hold-gun-company-stocks (cataloguing 
investments made by teacher pension funds in firearm manufacturer stocks). 
35 WEBBER, supra note 5, at 35-36 (observing CalSTRS divested more because of “moral 
outrage,” not because of typical investment rationales). 
36 Id. at 36 (detailing unique investment challenges activist shareholders face); cf. Jack 
Ehnes, An Engaged Conversation on Divestment, CALSTRS: PLAN PERSPECTIVE (Aug. 21, 
2013), https://www.calstrs.com/blog-entry/engaged-conversation-divestment [https://perma. 
cc/3REC-PXDN] (advocating engagement over divestment); Rebecca Leber, Divestment 
Won’t Hurt Big Oil, and That’s OK, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 20, 2015), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/121848/does-divestment-work [https://perma.cc/DN2Y-RZ 
GS] (arguing even if divestment does not financially impact company, it can be useful “for 
driving home the message of the broader campaign” behind divestment). 
37 See Weinberg & Mosendz, supra note 34 (detailing states in which pension funds are 
located). 
38 See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality 
(With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1279, 1281 (2001) (focusing on vitality of ultra vires doctrine in regards to restraining 
corporations to “lawful” purposes). 
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corporations from engaging in business activities outside of the range of 
activities identified in their charters.39 After states began granting general 
charters over a century ago, the doctrine largely fell away.40 But charters 
continue to require companies to engage in only lawful activities.41 As I have 
argued for some time, lawfulness continues to be a material constraint on 
corporate behavior and can be enforced not only using law external to the 
corporation but can also be enforced by use of the ultra vires doctrine.42 
Shareholders can sue companies to enjoin corporate illegalities as being ultra 
vires—beyond the power of the company.43 What’s more, shareholders can sue 
here in the United States when illegalities occur overseas, and even when the 
jurisdiction where the illegalities are occurring do not enforce the laws at issue.44 
The promise of legal behavior is in the charter, and the obligation runs to the 
shareholders.45 
Labor pension funds are the perfect plaintiffs for these suits. Pension funds 
understand that illegalities often have long-term negative financial effects on 
companies, even if they pay off in the short term.46 And pension funds can see 
that illegalities committed by companies often operate so as to hurt non-
shareholder stakeholders.47 So pension funds can see the costs of illegalities 
from both the point of view of labor-as-shareholder (because they care relatively 
more about the long term) and shareholder-as-labor (because illegalities are 
likely to hurt employees or other stakeholders more than shareholders who hold 
a mere financial interest in the company). I have been involved in a few of these 
suits, the most recent being a suit brought by the Louisiana Municipal Police 
Employees’ Retirement System against the Hershey Company for the illegal use 
of child labor in west Africa.48 I think there should be more suits like that one. 
 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 1302-13 (charting rise and fall of ultra vires doctrine’s prominence). 
41 Id. at 1281 (“[C]orporations are not authorized under their charters to commit crimes or 
otherwise act unlawfully.”). 
42 Id. at 1314-22 (detailing how ultra vires may enforce lawful corporate behavior). 
43 Id. at 1352-56 (outlining strategies for injunctive relief relying on ultra vires). 
44 Id. at 1372-78 (arguing ultra vires can bolster international law and norms). 
45 Ultra vires suits can also be brought by the attorney general of the incorporating 
jurisdiction. See id. at 1359 (“Forty-nine states still retain a provision in their state 
incorporation statutes that allows the state to dissolve a corpration or enjoin it from engaging 
in ultra vires activities.”). 
46 See id. at 1330-42 (detailing reasons why shareholders would want corporate managers 
to avoid unlawful acts). 
47 Id. at 1343 (noting how “other regarding preferences” may cause shareholders to be 
concerned about stakeholders’ position). 
48 See Kent Greenfield, ‘Blood Chocolate,’ Corporate Law and the ACS, ACSBLOG (Mar. 
24, 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/blood-chocolate-corporate-law-and-the-acs/ [http 
s://perma.cc/2TES-8JMZ] (tracing connections between chocolate manufacturing and child 
labor). 
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Finally, let me raise a challenge to one aspect of Webber’s book. Several times 
Webber mentions Citizens United v. FEC,49 and speaks of it in ways that appear 
to map with the conventional critique made among ideological progressives.50 
That critique, for the most part, is that Citizens United recognized the free speech 
rights of corporations, that corporate political spending has since exploded, that 
the political influence of unions has been swamped, and that our democracy has 
been perverted.51 
The story about Citizens United is more complicated. The decision did, in a 
roundabout way, unleash Super PACs to spend hundreds of millions of dollars 
in our elections. Super PAC spending went from sixty million dollars in 2010 to 
over six hundred million dollars in 2012 to roughly one billion dollars in 2016.52 
But that phenomenon came about because of the portion of Citizens United that 
had nothing to do with corporations per se, and which was then built on by cases 
in lower courts that interpreted Citizens United to allow for the creation of Super 
PACs.53 
But the story about corporate spending has more of a “dog [that] did nothing 
in the night-time” quality.54 The amount of corporate money in play in elections 
since Citizens United is quite small in comparison both to the amount of 
spending from individuals and to the total cost of campaigns.55 In the 2012 
 
49 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
50 See WEBBER, supra note 5, at 47-48 (noting how corporate law scholars scoff at Court’s 
conception of corporate governance in Citizens United). 
51 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 23 (criticizing Citizens United for “simplistic, 
libertarian theory of free speech”). 
52 Super PACs spent a total of $62,641,448 in the 2010 election, $609,936,792 in the 2012 
election, and $1,060,490,102 in the 2016 election. See 2016 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&c 
hrt=V&disp=O&type=S [https://perma.cc/23U2-2Y9X] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018) (listing 
Super PACs and political contribution during 2016 election cycle). 
53 See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing high bar 
government must clear to regulate campaign contributions). A plethora of academic 
commentary on Citizens United also exists. See Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, 
Corruption, and the Proxy War over Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10-
15 (2014) (criticizing Supreme Court’s narrow view of corruption); Michael S. Kang, The 
End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 52-63 (2012) (detailing potential post-
Citizens United campaign finance reforms); Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The 
Case v. the Controversy, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 464-78 (2015) (dissecting Citizens 
United).  
54 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK 
HOLMES 28 (1963). 
55 See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Expenditures of Corporations and Their 
Directors and Executives, 18 BUS. & POL. 367, 367 (2016) (“The anticipated flood of 
corporate political cash [after Citizens United] has amounted to no more than a trickle. In the 
2012 election cycle, a handful of predominantly privately owned corporations spent roughly 
$75 million from their treasuries on federal elections, or roughly one percent of the estimated 
$6 billion spent in total for the election cycle.”). 
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presidential cycle, publicly traded corporations were responsible for far less than 
one percent of the total independent expenditures in the 2012 presidential 
cycle,56 and the best data available on the 2016 cycle show that corporate 
spending was about the same.57 The impact would be somewhat larger if 
spending from private corporations is added. But much of that private company 
spending was through shell companies as a conduit for the contributions of 
wealthy individuals. That use of shell corporations may be problematic for a 
number of reasons, but it does not mean that corporations were trying to 
influence the election. It meant that individuals were trying to influence the 
election.58 
 
56 See id. at 371. Bonica includes in his figure of seventy-five million dollars 
approximately twenty million dollars from shell companies privately held by wealthy 
individuals and families. Id. That would make the amount from for-profit, publicly traded 
corporations less than one percent of the total. 
57 See generally OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ [https://perma.cc/VU8D 
-W6JG] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). This is the web-based database for the Center for 
Responsive Politics. The site does not organize the data in a way that makes it simple to search 
for corporate donors. Nevertheless, within the donor lists of the major Super PACs for the 
2016 cycle, very few for-profit, publicly traded companies appear. No corporate donor is 
listed for the top pro-Clinton Super PAC—Priorities USA Action. Priorities USA Action: 
Contributors, 2016 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.p 
hp?cmte=c00495861&cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/J9ZY-PU7W] (last visited Dec. 21, 
2018). The top pro-Trump Super PAC, Get Our Jobs Back, lists only two businesses as 
donors, and both are privately held. The top pro-Trump company was NY Post Publishing, 
which donated just over three hundred thousand dollars. Get Our Jobs Back: Expenditures, 
2016 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/expenditures.php?cycle= 
2016&cmte=C00616078 [https://perma.cc/JFS6-7XJK] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). Jeb 
Bush’s Super PAC, Right to Rise USA, had ten corporate donors, but nine of them are 
privately held and appear to have been conduits for individual money. Right to Rise USA: 
Contributors, 2016 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.p 
hp?cycle=2016&cmte=C00571372 [https://perma.cc/Z7R9-HMYS] (last visited Dec. 21, 
2018). The single largest public company donor was NextEra Energy, a clean energy 
company, which gave one million dollars. NextEra Energy: Profile for  2016 Election Cycle, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000321&cycle 
=2016 [https://perma.cc/H4EH-KSYT] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). The Senate Leadership 
Fund (a pro Republican PAC) had only three corporate donors listed for 2016, with Chevron, 
which gave two million dollars, being the only publicly traded company appearing on the list. 
Senate Leadership Fund: Contributors, 2016 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open 
secrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=C00571703&cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/VTF2-C7 
85] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). The Congressional Leadership Fund (a pro Republican PAC) 
had two public company donors—Chevron at $1.3 million and Devon Energy at $500,000. 
Congressional Leadership Fund: Contributors, 2016 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www. 
opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=C00504530&cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/A63B-
UZK8] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
58 See GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 130-31. 
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The reality is that most of the money flowing into Super PACs in both the 
2012 and 2016 presidential election cycles originated not from the coffers of for-
profit corporations, but from wealthy individuals and labor unions.59 
For example, in the 2012 elections, the biggest corporate spender was 
Chevron, which spent $2.5 million to support its preferred candidates.60 This 
may sound like a large amount, but it was dwarfed by the spending of wealthy 
individuals. Sheldon Adelson, the casino owner, spent more than ninety million 
dollars in the same cycle, and the Koch brothers ran a network of groups that 
together spent over four hundred million dollars.61 Chevron’s involvement was 
also tiny by comparison to its size. In 2012, Chevron had operating revenues of 
$231 billion and net income of $26.2 billion.62 Its political spending was, 
therefore, about 0.001% of its revenues and 0.01% of its income.63 
In the 2016 cycle, too, publicly traded corporations were not active 
spenders.64 According to data gathered by the Center for Responsive Politics, of 
 
59 Id. at 24. 
60 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay to Play: A Model 
Explaining Why the SEC Regulates Money in Politics, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 402 
(2013) (listing contributions of publicly traded corporations to Super PACs during 2012 
election cycle); Press Release, Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Washington, Post-Election 
Money in Politics Analysis (Nov. 9, 2012), http://s3.amazonaws.com/storage.citizensfor 
ethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20022643/2012_Election_Analysis.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/J755-35VB] (“Most large, publicly-traded corporations avoided public super PAC 
donations, but in October Chevron gave $2.5 million to the Congressional Leadership Fund, 
a conservative super PAC with close ties to House Speaker John Boehner.”); Dave Levinthal 
& Tarini Parti, 5 Money Takeaways from 2012, POLITICO (Nov. 17, 2012), http://www.politico 
.com/story/2012/11/five-money-takeaways-from-2012-083655?o=0 [https://perma.cc/R8Q4-
3L8X] (“When oil company Chevron donated $2.5 million to the pro-Republican 
Congressional Leadership Fund super PAC in October, it marked the highest-profile example 
of a publicly traded corporation directly injecting cash into political elections since the 2010 
Citizens United decision.”). 
61 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open 
secrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D [https://perma.cc/RL6J-R3S5] 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2018) (listing Adelson’s political contributions during 2012 election 
cycle); Political Nonprofits: Top Election Spenders, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open 
secrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_elec.php?cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/Z3UK-Y9J7] 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2018) (compiling spending by 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) groups during 
2012 election cycle); Andrew Prokop, 40 Charts That Explain Money in Politics, VOX (July 
30, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/30/5949581/money-in-politics-charts-
explain [https://perma.cc/68C8-TMBP] (“During the 2012 elections, one dark money network 
was particularly elaborate and influential—the one tied to the billionaire Koch brothers, which 
spent at least $400 million on the effort.”); The Koch Network: A Cartological Guide, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/koch-network-
a-cartological-guide/ [https://perma.cc/6QUN-XE6K] (diagramming network of Koch 
brothers’ political groups). 
62 GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 24-25. 
63 Id. 
64 According to the New York Times, as of February 2016, in the heat of the primary season, 
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the nearly three thousand instances of corporate contributions to Super PACs in 
2016, only a tiny number came from publicly traded companies.65 In fact, there 
were only twenty-six corporate donations of one million dollars or more in the 
2016 cycle and only forty-two of more than five hundred thousand dollars.66 Of 
the top fifty donations, only nine were made by publicly traded companies or 
their subsidiaries.67 Chevron made four, totaling $3.3 million; Devon Energy 
gave two, totaling $1.25 million; a subsidiary of ConoccoPhillips gave one 
million dollars; NextEra energy gave one million dollars; and a subsidiary of the 
parent company of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco gave one million dollars.68 The other 
donations to Super PACs came from privately held companies, and, as noted, 
many appear to be mere conduits for contributions from their dominant 
shareholders.69 Totaled together, the top fifty donations from both public and 
private business entities amounted to just over fifty-two million dollars.70 This 
is about thirty million dollars less than Sheldon Adelson and his wife gave in 
2016.71 What’s more, of the large donations from public companies to Super 
PACs, only one—NextEra’s one million dollars—was spent in support of a 
presidential candidate: Jeb Bush, who dropped out of the race in February 
2016.72 That is worth emphasizing. In one of the most heated elections in modern 
 
eighty-seven donors had given at least a million dollars to a candidate or a candidate’s Super 
PACs. Of those eighty-seven, only nine donors were for-profit corporations. Of those nine, 
only one was publicly traded. Of the eight private companies, most appear to be dominated 
by a single owner. Wilson Andrews et al., Million-Dollar Donors in the 2016 Presidential 
Race, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/ 
elections/top-presidential-donors-campaign-money.html (cataloging top donors in 2016 
presidential election); see also COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. OF THE CONF. BD., THE LANDSCAPE OF 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 9 (2016), https://www.ced.org/pdf/Election_Spending_Report_-
_Nov_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/T23E-DNSW] (“Even after Citizens United, most of the 
money raised and spent to support candidates in federal elections comes from individual 
donations subject to contribution limits and disclosed to the public.”); Theo Francis, Despite 
Citizens United, Corporate Super PAC Contributions Trail Individuals, Study Finds, WALL 
STREET J. (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/despite-citizens-united-corporate-
super-pac-contributions-trail-individuals-study-finds-1478059201 (comparing corporate 
Super PAC contributions to individual campaign contributions). 
65 These figures are derived from a spreadsheet of all corporate expenditures in 2016, 
provided to the author by the Center for Responsive Politics. The spreadsheet is on file with 
author. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See Top Individual Contributors: All Federal Contributions, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topindivs.php?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/9SNT-
MW5P] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018) (noting Adelsons donated $82,582,800).  
72 Right to Rise USA: Contributors, 2016 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.open 
secrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cycle=2016&cmte=C00571372 [https://perma.cc/9AXR-Q3 
  
2019]THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER REVIEW 315 
 
history, only one publicly traded company contributed one million dollars or 
more to a Super PAC supporting a presidential candidate in 2016. And that 
money went to a candidate who lost early. The remaining large corporate 
donations went to groups supporting candidates in Congress. Not a single large 
corporate expenditure went to support either candidate who won the nomination 
of the two major parties in 2016. 
Sometimes ignored in the debate over Citizens United is the fact that the Court 
did not only remove the cap from corporate spending in elections. It also 
removed the statutory cap on the independent expenditures of unions.73 Unlike 
corporate spending, unions have indeed increased their political expenditures 
markedly. In the 2016 cycle, the Service Employees International Union 
contributed about thirty-nine million dollars directly to candidates and other 
groups and spent nearly twenty-five million dollars independently.74 The 
National Education Association spent and contributed over thirty million 
dollars.75 The Laborers Union spent nearly thirty million dollars and the AFL-
CIO spent nearly twenty million dollars.76 Based on these numbers, one can 
make a strong argument that the groups who have benefited most from Citizens 
United have been unions and the politicians they support.77 Citizens United 
allowed unions another battlefield on which to fight—that of electoral politics. 
Going forward, given the difficulties unions face across the board and the new 
challenges they face because of the Supreme Court’s recent decision striking 
down on free speech grounds the method by which unions finance themselves,78 
we might come to realize that Citizens United is a lifeline to unions. Their power 
will not arise just because they can mobilize members to picket, protest, and 
vote.79 They will be able to use their financial strengths in the electoral space to 
 
GD] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018); see also 2016 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016& 
disp=D&type=O&superonly=N [https://perma.cc/XLP5-8VVA] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018) 
(listing “top individuals and organizations spending their money to influence your vote”). 
73 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318-19 (2010) (holding provision of act 
banning unions from using general treasury funds to fund “electioneering communication” 
unconstitutional). 
74 Service Employees International Union: Profile for 2016 Election, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=d000000077&cycle=2016 [https://per 
ma.cc/ALL6-3KLN] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
75 National Education Assn: Profile for 2016 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=d000000064&cycle=2016 
[https://perma.cc/G79F-P6G7] (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
76 AFL-CIO: Profile for 2016 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensec 
rets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=d000000088&cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/87N8-U7DW] 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
77 For more on the impact of Citizens United, see generally GREENFIELD, supra note 15. 
78 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) 
(holding agency fees violated First Amendment).  
79 WEBBER, supra note 5, at 15-30 (juxtaposing lackluster results from union strike with 
impressive results from shareholder activism). 
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influence elections. Along with the efforts that Webber suggests—using the 
financial strengths of shareholder-as-labor and labor-as-shareholder—the 
unions will be able to fight to protect themselves against the forces of capital 
with, ironically, the power of money. 
 
